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At the heart of the current banking crisis is a key change to the way in 
which banks operate: a change which has created a relational deficit. 
Traditionally, banks lent money to companies and to people who wanted 
a mortgage, and then the banks collected the repayments of that money 
for themselves. There was therefore an ongoing relationship between the 
bank which lent the money and the customer who borrowed the money. 
The fact of this ongoing relationship meant that the bank had a direct 
financial interest in making sure that the customer was likely to be able 
to repay the money. This model of banking is now being described as 
“originate and hold” because the bank which originates the loan holds on 
to the loan. The direct relationship between the original customer and 
the originating bank is maintained throughout the life of the loan. 
In the 1970s, U.S. government-backed social mortgage lenders, Fannie 
Mae (Federal National Mortgage Association), Ginnie Mae (Government 
National Mortgage Association) and Freddie Mac (Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation), started using a different model. They would 
make loans on generous terms to people who would otherwise have 
found it difficult to get a mortgage and, rather than waiting for those 
loans to be repaid over the lifetime of the loan, would sell on the loans to 
commercial financial institutions. Those loans were attractive to 
commercial financial institutions because, if the borrowers could not 
repay the loans, the U.S. government had guaranteed their repayment. 
By selling on their loans, Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae and Freddie Mac 
received cash up front instead of having to wait for the loans to be 
repaid. This meant that they could lend more money more quickly to 
other borrowers. This new model of banking is called the ‘originate and 
distribute’ model, because the bank which originates the loan then 
distributes the loan to other banks, so that, whether the customer knows 
it or not, the banks who are expecting to be repaid are not the bank 
which originally made the loan. 
It didn’t take private banks long to realise that what Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac were doing, they could also do. Banks would bundle 
together mortgage loans and sell them on to other banks. By doing this, 
some banks were able to grow their business far faster than their 
depositor base or shareholder investment would otherwise have allowed. 
Northern Rock expanded its business rapidly by making mortgage loans, 
selling them on to other banks, using the money received from the other 
banks to make more mortgage loans and then repeating the cycle. 
Changes in the ways banks were regulated, reached in an international 
agreement called the Basel Capital Accord in 1988, encouraged this 
practice, but it really exploded between 2003 and 2006 when the 
percentage of mortgage-backed securities issued by private sector banks 
increased from 24% of those issued in the USA to 60%. 
The result was that by the summer of 2007, banks all over the world had 
bought bundles of American mortgage loans from those American banks 
which had made them in the first place. Then house prices began to drop 
in the U.S.A. Banks suddenly realised that if enough American borrowers 
could not repay their mortgages then there was a real risk that they 
would not be repaid on the loans they had bought. No-one knew how 
much the mortgage debt they had bought was worth. It might even be 
worthless. Banks stopped lending to one another. So when Northern 
Rock in the summer of 2007 went to the markets to ask to borrow more 
money to finance its business, they all said ‘no’. As a last resort, it went 
to the Bank of England to borrow money, and the rest, as they say, is 
history. 
The ‘originate and hold’ model of banking is not perfect. The Jubilee 
Centre has long argued that debt finance is inherently problematic in 
relational terms, creating as it does imbalances of power and conflicts of 
interest between the lender and the borrower. However, at least the 
originating bank and the original borrower have a direct relationship, and 
one in which the originating bank is directly interested in the question of 
whether the borrower will be able to repay the loan. 
Under the ‘originate and distribute’ model of banking, the aim of the 
bank which has made the loan is to sell the loan to another bank. This 
bank has no direct interest in making sure that the borrower is able to 
repay the loan because, if the borrower is unable to make the 
repayments, it will be another bank which loses out. Of course, a bank 
which becomes known for making reckless loans may find it difficult to 
sell them on, but that fact may not be discovered for several years, by 
which time the people who sold the loans in the first place will have 
collected their bonuses and may well have moved on. 
The ‘originate and distribute’ model of banking creates a serious problem 
which economists call ‘moral hazard’. The originating bank does not have 
sufficient incentive to be careful in who it loans to and how much it loans. 
As the House of Commons Treasury Committee noted, there were looser 
standards of lending and underwriting mortgages which ‘are linked to the 
decisive loosening of the link between creditor and debtor under the 
“originate and distribute” banking model. This model encourages 
reckless lending. Reckless lending has serious consequences for 
everyone. Reckless lending means borrowers are lent money they cannot 
afford to repay. They then buy houses they cannot afford to live in, 
spend money on consumer goods they cannot afford, and when they fail 
to make their mortgage repayments, suffer the consequences, often 
including family break-up, which accompany serious debt. Reckless 
mortgage lending also affects everyone in society, driving house prices 
upwards beyond a point which is sustainable. If only the super-rich can 
afford to buy a family house in the South-East of England, then those 
providing services to the super-rich have to commute further and further 
distances to get to work, with consequential damage to the environment 
in terms of pollution and to family life, as parents have less time to 
spend with their children. 
A modest proposal 
It is disastrous, from a relational perspective, for a bank which makes a 
loan to be able to sell on the whole of that loan to other banks. The 
economic consequences of this taking place on a massive scale are ones 
which we are all living with at the moment. At the very least, originating 
banks ought to be required to retain 20% of the risk in relation to the 
original loan, so that they have sufficient incentive to take proper 
precautions to see if the borrower can afford to make the repayments. In 
relation to more complex forms of on-selling, where the repackaged 
loans have been divided up into different tranches, the originating bank 
ought to be required to hold on to a greater percentage of the so-called 
equity tranche, i.e. the riskiest portion of the loans, which bears the 
highest risk of non-repayment.  
 
